Do implicit and explicit belief processing share neural substrates? by Naughtin, Claire K. et al.
Do Implicit and Explicit Belief Processing Share
Neural Substrates?
Claire K. Naughtin,1* Kristina Horne,1 Dana Schneider,2 Dustin Venini,1
Ashley York,1 and Paul E. Dux 1*
1School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
2Institute of Psychology, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena, Germany
r r
Abstract: Humans rely on their ability to infer another person’s mental state to understand and predict
others’ behavior (“theory of mind,” ToM). Multiple lines of research suggest that not only are humans
able to consciously process another person’s belief state, but also are able to do so implicitly. Here we
explored how general implicit belief states are represented in the brain, compared to those substrates
involved in explicit ToM processes. Previous work on this topic has yielded conflicting results, and
thus, the extent to which the implicit and explicit ToM systems draw on common neural bases is
unclear. Participants were presented with “Sally-Anne” type movies in which a protagonist was falsely
led to believe a ball was in one location, only for a puppet to later move it to another location in their
absence (false-belief condition). In other movies, the protagonist had their back turned the entire time
the puppet moved the ball between the two locations, meaning that they had no opportunity to
develop any pre-existing beliefs about the scenario (no-belief condition). Using a group of indepen-
dently localized explicit ToM brain regions, we found greater activity for false-belief trials, relative to
no-belief trials, in the right temporoparietal junction, right superior temporal sulcus, precuneus, and
left middle prefrontal gyrus. These findings extend upon previous work on the neural bases of implicit
ToM by showing substantial overlap between this system and the explicit ToM system, suggesting that
both abilities might recruit a common set of mentalizing processes/functional brain regions. Hum Brain
Mapp 00:000–000, 2017. VC 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
In any given social interaction, humans will likely
engage in some degree of mental state processing to infer
what their social partner is thinking, feeling or intending
to do. This capacity to process another person’s internal
state is referred to as having a “theory of mind” (ToM),
and is crucial for understanding and predicting another
person’s behavior [Frith and Frith, 2005; Premack and
Woodruff, 1978]. ToM is considered to be a key milestone
in social development [Razza and Blair, 2009; Slaughter
et al., 2013] that persists into adulthood, but can decline
later in life [Henry et al., 2013; cf. Maylor et al., 2002].
Impairments in ToM have been linked to numerous devel-
opmental disorders, such as autism and schizophrenia,
whereby such individuals fail to pass formal tests of this
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ability and show altered mental state processing [Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985; Brune, 2005; Moran et al., 2011].
Although the capacity for ToM was traditionally thought
to emerge around 4 years of age [Perner and Lang, 1999;
Wellman et al., 2001], more recent evidence suggests that
children can spontaneously infer and track another per-
son’s mental state at much younger ages [e.g., Scott and
Baillargeon, 2017; Senju et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2007].
Such findings have been taken as evidence for an automatic
[Cohen and German, 2009] or implicit [Apperly and Butter-
fill, 2009] belief processing system that is distinct from its
more explicit counterpart [for recent reviews, see
Schneider et al., 2015, 2017]. Here we shed new light on
how implicit and explicit ToM processes are related and
reflected in the human brain.
Clements and Perner [1994] provided initial evidence for
the distinction between implicit and explicit ToM using an
anticipatory-looking paradigm. This approach was based
on the classic “Sally-Anne” measure of explicit ToM
[Wimmer and Perner, 1983], in which a protagonist (Sally)
puts a ball in one of two locations and then leaves the
scene. While Sally is away, a second character (Anne)
moves the ball to the other available location. Sally then
returns to the scene, and the critical question is, where
will Sally look for the ball? In addition to this explicit mea-
sure of ToM, Clements and Perner also assessed children’s
implicit belief processing by measuring anticipatory eye
movements to the two possible ball locations. Children
aged 2 years 11 months and older were more likely to
look at the location consistent with the protagonist’s belief
about the ball location, rather than the location where the
ball actually was. In contrast, only children aged 4 years
and above were able to pass the explicit belief test. Similar
tests of implicit belief processing suggest that it is present
in children as young as 15 months old [Onishi and Baillar-
geon, 2005; Senju et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2007; Surian
et al., 2007], although the status of infant implicit ToM is
disputed [Ruffman, 2014). Implicit ToM is also evident in
adults [Schneider et al., 2012a,b, 2014a], but seems to be
impaired in autism spectrum disorder populations
[Schneider et al., 2013; Senju et al., 2009]. These behavioral
findings in infants and adults suggest there are fundamen-
tal differences between these two forms of belief
processing.
Apperly and Butterfill [2009] and Butterfill and Apperly
[2013] put forward a two-path ToM system account to
explain the developmental dissociation between implicit
and explicit forms of mentalizing: An earlier developing
pathway that can rapidly extract belief-like states without
awareness, and a later developing pathway that supports
conscious, deliberate belief processing, and is more suscep-
tible to interference from other executive functions. The
former pathway arguably underpins behavior in implicit
eye-tracking measures of belief processing and the latter
pathway is reflected by explicit mental state judgements.
Furthermore, it has been hypothesized that the implicit
ToM system represents the minimal elements of a belief
that can be used to track another person’s internal state,
without the need to generate a complete belief representa-
tion [Butterfill and Apperly, 2013], or forms part of our
core “social sense” [Kovacs et al., 2010]. In support of this
idea, Schneider et al. [2012a] found individuals’ ability to
implicitly monitor a protagonist’s belief about a ball loca-
tion sustained over a 1-h testing session. This suggests
that, unlike other automatic cognitive processes (e.g.,
stimulus-driven attentional capture; Asplund et al. [2010]),
implicit belief monitoring does not rapidly habituate over
time. However, Low and Watts [2013] found the implicit
ToM system is limited in the types of belief states it can
process, such that children aged 3–4 years and adults alike
can monitor another’s belief about an object’s location, but
not beliefs about an object’s identity.
A host of studies have used functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) to explore the neural basis of the
explicit ToM system [for recent meta-analyses, see Molen-
berghs et al., 2016; Schurz et al., 2014]. One way to probe
explicit ToM processes is to compare brain activity under
conditions where participants are asked to explicitly evalu-
ate the mental state of a protagonist, compared with mak-
ing a physical judgement. Such comparisons reliably
produce increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), superior temporal
sulcus (STS), precuneus, and temporal poles [e.g., Dodell-
Feder et al., 2011; Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe and Kanw-
isher, 2003]. Moreover, these brain regions can also distin-
guish between belief states that are consistent with the
state of affairs (i.e., a true-belief), relative to those that are
inconsistent (i.e., a false-belief), suggesting that they are
sensitive to the content rather than merely the presence of
belief states [Aichhorn et al., 2009; D€ohnel et al., 2012;
Sommer et al., 2007]. In particular, the TPJ is considered to
be a core component of the explicit mentalizing network
(specifically in the right hemisphere), and is involved in a
range of mental state reasoning tasks [Saxe, 2009; Saxe and
Kanwisher, 2003]. Indeed, a recent fMRI meta-analysis of
ToM studies found the TPJ is consistently engaged in ToM
processing regardless of the specific task demands [Schurz
et al., 2014].
Comparatively, much less is known about the neural
bases of implicit ToM processes and the extent to which
this system overlaps with the explicit ToM system. Imag-
ing work to date into implicit ToM has relied on indirect
measures or paradigms that were designed to elicit spon-
taneous mental state processing [e.g., Castelli et al., 2000;
Gobbini et al., 2007; Iacoboni et al., 2004; Ramsey et al.,
2013; Wagner et al., 2011; Wheatley et al., 2007]. As a
recent example, Rice and Redcay [2016] engaged partici-
pants in an interaction with another social partner, which
they were led to believe was shown either in real time or
prerecorded. These authors found the bilateral TPJ, precu-
neus, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), mPFC, and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) activated more
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strongly when participants thought the interaction was in
real-time rather than pre-recorded. Hence, live social inter-
actions could place greater demands on the (implicit) men-
talizing system or engage a broader selection of social
cognitive processes (e.g., speech processing) to create a
shared social experience [Rice and Redcay, 2016]. Also,
works employing violation of expectation paradigms [e.g.,
Bardi et al., 2017; Kovacs et al., 2014] have suggested that
the TPJ is specifically engaged in processing implicit men-
tal states. Note, however, these findings have been called
into question given that the belief state processing was
confounded with an attention-checking procedure in these
paradigms [Phillips et al., 2015].
While the brain regions implicated in the aforemen-
tioned studies somewhat overlap with those implicated in
explicit ToM processing, the extent to which this activity
reflects implicit belief processing is unclear for two rea-
sons. First, participants in these experiments passively
viewed the stimuli used to evoke mental state processing
or were instructed to make judgements about its content.
Put differently, the belief-inducing stimuli were always
task-relevant. Even though participants were never explic-
itly asked to report mental states in these studies, there is
no way to guarantee that they did not still engage in
explicit, conscious ToM processing. Second, as partici-
pants’ level of engagement in mental state processing was
never directly assessed, we do not know whether they
were unaware of the mentalizing nature of the experimen-
tal stimuli. Therefore, the apparent overlap could simply
reflect a single explicit ToM process, rather than a com-
mon network for implicit and explicit ToM abilities. We
have previously developed ways to address these two con-
cerns [Schneider et al., 2014b]. First, we made the belief-
evoking stimuli task-irrelevant by engaging participants in
a secondary tone detection task, and second, we explicitly
probed participants’ level of belief processing using a fun-
neled debriefing questionnaire [Bargh and Chartrand,
2009] to identify (and exclude) participants who were
aware of the belief manipulations.
Specifically in our work [Schneider et al., 2014a], we
used Sally-Anne type movies that were adapted from ear-
lier developmental studies [Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005;
Senju et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2007] to be appropriate
for an adult sample [Schneider et al., 2012a]. In the initial
belief set-up phase, participants observed a protagonist
watch a puppet move a ball to one of two possible boxes,
before leaving the room, either before the puppet made a
second ball movement (true-belief condition) or after
(false-belief condition). Then in the belief test phase, while
the actor was out of the room, the puppet moved the ball
to the opposite box location for a third time, meaning the
ball was in the original box location when the actor then
returned. The actual ball location therefore either matched
or mismatched the protagonist’s belief about its location
(i.e., they had a true- or false-belief, respectively). Criti-
cally, activity was compared between true- and false-belief
conditions during the belief test phase where the videos
were physically identical. Thus, unlike in previous para-
digms, any differences in activity could not be driven by
visual differences [e.g., Gobbini et al., 2007; Iacoboni et al.,
2004; Wheatley et al., 2007]. We found the precuneus and
left STS were more responsive to false- than true-belief
scenarios, suggesting that these brain areas constitute the
core components of the implicit ToM processing system.
A notable contrast between the findings from Schneider
et al. [2014a] and previous fMRI studies on implicit ToM
processing is the lack of TPJ involvement. This result is
surprising given that this brain region appears to be a core
component of the explicit ToM network [Saxe, 2009; Saxe
and Kanwisher, 2003; Schurz et al., 2014]. Specifically,
Schneider et al. [2014a] found activity in the TPJ could dis-
tinguish between the presence and absence of explicit
belief states, but was not modulated by true and false
implicit belief conditions. This finding suggests that this
region might not be sensitive to the differential demands
placed on the implicit ToM system and/or the content of
implicit belief states.
Hyde et al. [2015] aimed to resolve this discrepancy
using functional near-infrared spectroscopy, a neuroimag-
ing technique that has greater temporal resolution (albeit
reduced spatial resolution) than fMRI and can identify
more fine-grain changes in brain activity across time.
These authors modified the paradigm used by Schneider
et al. [2014a] to also include trials where the protagonist
could directly perceive the ball (i.e., the two possible box
locations were transparent). The direct perception condi-
tion was comparable to the true-belief condition in terms
of the protagonist’s mental state (their belief about the ball
location matched reality), and to the false-belief condition
in terms of the physical movements (i.e., to control for
low-level visual differences between conditions, such as in
Schneider et al. [2014a]). Hyde et al. [2015] found greater
activity in the right TPJ for false-belief trials, relative to
both true-belief and direct perception trials, specifically
around the time period where the puppet moved the ball
without the protagonist’s knowledge (i.e., when the false-
belief was created). It is unclear from these findings, how-
ever, whether Schneider et al. [2014a] failed to find evi-
dence of implicit ToM processing in the TPJ due to
limitations in the temporal resolution of fMRI (as sug-
gested by Hyde et al. [2015]), or whether this result reflects
a functional difference in this brain region’s role in
implicit and explicit belief processing.
Thus, based on the work to date, it is still unclear how
implicit belief processing is reflected in the brain. All pre-
vious fMRI investigations into spontaneous, implicit belief
processes have relied solely on comparisons between true-
and false-belief conditions [Bardi et al., 2017; Hyde et al.,
2015; Kovacs et al., 2014; Schneider et al., 2014a], which
might have underestimated or overlooked a more general
belief processing system in the brain that is recruited for
both explicit and implicit ToM tasks. Studies examining
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the neural bases of goal, intention and trait attribution,
social inference processes—which also draw heavily on
ToM operations and perhaps even those implicated in
false-belief analysis—are indeed suggestive of a common
belief processing system. These studies have found that
implicit, explicit, and attributional processes tap overlap-
ping brain regions (e.g., TPJ, mPFC) and have a similar
temporal signature as assessed via electroencephalogram
(EEG) [Van Overwalle and Vandekerckhove, 2013].
To test whether a common belief processing system spe-
cifically exists for ToM operations, the present study
employed a similar Sally–Anne paradigm to Schneider
et al. [2014a]; see also Hyde et al. [2015] in conjunction
with fMRI. On each trial, participants watched movies
involving a protagonist, a puppet, and a ball. The protago-
nist sometimes watched the puppet move the ball between
two possible locations, meaning their belief about the ball
location was later falsified when the puppet switched the
ball location in their absence. Alternatively, they would
have their back to the entire scenario and thus, never
developed any beliefs about the ball’s location or the
puppet.
We used a region of interest (ROI) approach to identify
brain regions involved in spontaneous, implicit belief proc-
essing. To this end, we compared brain activity between
conditions where the protagonist held a false-belief about
the state of affairs, relative to when they had no precon-
ceived beliefs about the scenario. Our ROIs reflected brain
areas that are sensitive to explicit belief states, and were
independently localized by comparing activity between
conditions that require conscious mental state processing
to conditions devoid of any belief states [e.g., Dodell-Feder
et al., 2011]. If the implicit ToM system draws on the same
general-belief brain regions as the explicit ToM system, we
should see a large degree of overlap between these two
functional networks. In particular, if the TPJ does indeed
form part of the functional network of implicit ToM, then
we would expect it would differentially respond to false-
belief situations, relative to situations where the protago-
nist has no preconceived beliefs.
METHOD
Overview
Participants were presented with false-belief and no-
belief movies that consisted of two phases: First, a belief
set-up phase where we manipulated whether the protago-
nist had a false-belief or no-belief about the location of a
ball, and second, a belief test phase where we assessed for
behavioral and neural differences between the two belief
conditions, whilst keeping all physical elements of the dis-
play constant (Fig. 1). The belief test phase of both belief
conditions was identical (the exact same movie was used),
except for the fact that the protagonist either had a false-
belief or no-belief about the ball location based on what
they experienced in the belief set-up phase (where we
manipulated the specific movie events between conditions
to induce different belief expectations). Therefore, any
changes in behavior or brain activity during this belief test
phase would be driven by the differential belief processing
demands alone. In the false-belief condition, there was a
mismatch between their belief and the protagonist’s belief
about the ball location, meaning that participants had to
simultaneously monitor multiple conflicting beliefs (higher
mentalizing demands). In the no-belief condition, however,
the protagonist did not hold any pre-existing beliefs about
the ball location (as they never witnessed the ball being
moved), meaning that the participant only had to monitor
their own belief state (lower mentalizing demands).
The final frame of the belief test movie froze for 6 s at
the end of the phase so that we could monitor partici-
pants’ anticipatory eye movements as an implicit measure
of belief processing. This approach has been used in previ-
ous implicit ToM experiments that compared true- and
false-belief conditions: the logic being that participants are
more likely to first fixate (and to fixate for longer) on the
box that does not contain the ball if the protagonist holds
a false-belief that the ball is at that location, relative to a
true-belief that the ball is not at that location (Schneider
et al., 2012a,b, 2013, 2014a,b). This hypothesis is based on
the assumption that preferential looking to the protago-
nist’s belief location is indicative of implicit mental state
attribution (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate et al.,
2007; Surian et al., 2007). We expected to see a similar
increase in no-ball fixations under the false-belief com-
pared with the no-belief condition.
Throughout both movie phases, participants’ task was to
detect the presence of high- and low-frequency tones,
meaning that the movies were task-irrelevant and their
task did not require active engagement in any belief proc-
essing. At the end of the experiment, participants also
completed a funneled debriefing questionnaire to assess
for awareness of belief processing (adapted from Bargh
and Chartrand [2009]). All participants identified as being
conscious of our belief processing manipulation were
excluded from further data analyses.
Participants
We recruited 33 volunteers (13 males) with a mean age
of 24.4 years (SD5 4.0) for this experiment. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, gave writ-
ten informed consent, had no history of neurological or
psychiatric disorders, and were financially reimbursed for
their time and participation. Data were excluded from
participants who showed evidence of explicit belief proc-
essing in the debriefing questionnaire (n5 10) and from
one participant that had no behavioral data recorded due
to a technical error (henceforth, N5 22). The University of
Queensland’s Human Research Ethics committee approved
this experimental protocol.




Upon entering the MRI scanner, participants first com-
pleted the implicit ToM task adapted from our previous
fMRI study [Schneider et al., 2014a]. As previously
described (see Overview), each trial consisted of a belief
set-up movie followed by a belief test movie to assess the
effects of the prior belief manipulation (which was the
same for each condition). The false-belief set-up phase
began with the protagonist facing towards the camera
with a ball in the center of the table (Fig. 1B, upper panels;
www.youtube.com/watch?v5 2tG7SnwKi1E). They watched
as a puppet appeared and placed a central ball in one of the
boxes, and then moved the ball to the other box (the left
and right movements were randomized across trials). This
phase concluded with the protagonist leaving the room. In
the no-belief set-up phase, the puppet’s behavior is identi-
cal (it made the same two ball movements), but the protag-
onist had her back to the puppet throughout the entire
movie (Fig. 1B, lower panels; https://youtu.be/LI_WJXLepB0).
Thus, the protagonist had no opportunity to create any
beliefs about the ball, its location, or the puppet. The same
movie was used in the belief test phase for false-belief and
no-belief trials (Fig. 1C; https://youtu.be/evFRneJxxYE),
in which the puppet returned, moved the ball from its
Figure 1.
Schematic representation of the implicit ToM task. (A) Overview
of trial structure. Participants are first presented with a “get
ready” prompt, followed by the belief set-up movie sequence
and the belief test movie sequence, with an extended 10 s inter-
stimulus interval between each movie. (B) The belief set-up
sequence was used to manipulate the implicit belief state of the
protagonist in the movie. On false-belief trials, the protagonist
faced forward and watched as the puppet moved the ball to one
of the box locations, and then to the other, before leaving the
scene. On no-belief trials, the puppet made the same two ball
movements, except the protagonist had their back to the pup-
pet. The protagonist therefore never had the opportunity to
develop any pre-existing beliefs about the puppet or the ball’s
location. (C) The belief test sequence was identical across both
false-belief and no-belief trials, and was designed to test the
impact of the presence or absence of the protagonist’s prior
belief about the ball’s location. While the protagonist was still
out of the room, the puppet moved the ball from its current
location to the other box, and then the protagonist returned to
sit at the table facing forward. On the false-belief trials, the pro-
tagonist’s belief about the ball’s location (e.g., left box) was
incongruent with its actual location (e.g., right box), but on no-
belief trials, the protagonist still had no pre-existing beliefs about
the ball’s location, or any knowledge that the ball exists at all.
The belief test sequence ended with the final movie frame fro-
zen for 6 s, during which time we measured anticipatory eye
movements to each of the box locations and the protagonist’s
face.
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current box to the opposite box and then left the scene. The
protagonist returned and sat at the table, facing forward
with her gaze centered between the two boxes. The belief
test phase ended with the final frame frozen for a further
6 s, during which time we analyzed anticipatory eye move-
ments to the protagonist’s face and the two box locations.
Participants were instructed to pay attention to the mov-
ies, but their primary task was to detect the presence of
high- and low-frequency tones (2 and 1.1 kHz, respec-
tively) by pressing one of two buttons as quickly and
accurately as possible. This task was designed to distract
participants from the content of the movies, thus minimiz-
ing the extent to which they explicitly processed the belief
states of the protagonist or puppet. There were four tones
presented in the belief set-up phase and two tones in the
belief test phase. The timing of these presentations was
randomized across both phases, with the constraints that
there was a minimum of 4 s between each tone and that
no tones appeared during the 6 s still frame of the belief
test movie (where we analyzed eye movements). Perfor-
mance on this task was close to ceiling, where participants
correctly identified the tones on an average of 94.2% of tri-
als (SD5 6.7%). Each trial lasted for 74 s and consisted of
a “get ready” prompt (2 s), followed by the belief set-up
movie (26 s), an interstimulus interval (10 s), the belief test
movie (26 s), and a second interstimulus interval (10 s)
(Fig. 1A). The extended delay between each stimulus
ensured that the BOLD signal returned to baseline before
the next stimulus appeared. There were a total of 20 false-
belief and 20 no-belief trials split over 8 runs. The protago-
nist wore a visor throughout all the movies to ensure that
her eye gaze did not produce any attentional cueing
effects [Bayliss and Tipper, 2006], and we have previously
confirmed that this is not a contributing factor in our
spontaneous, implicit belief paradigm [Schneider et al.,
2012a].
Funneled debriefing questionnaire
Immediately following the implicit ToM task, partici-
pants completed a funneled debriefing questionnaire to
assess their level of explicit belief processing in the pro-
ceeding task. This 10-item questionnaire was similar to
what we have used previously [Schneider et al., 2012a,
2014a], and is designed to incrementally probe partici-
pants’ level of awareness of our belief manipulation (e.g.,
“what did you think the story was in the videos?”). We
excluded any participants whose responses suggested that
they had explicit awareness of our belief conditions and/
or engaged in belief processing during the task. That is, if
they specifically referred to the mental state or the
expected behavior of the protagonist or puppet (e.g., “the
koala [puppet] was trying to trick the girl [protagonist]”).
Importantly, this questionnaire was completed after the
implicit measure of ToM was acquired, meaning that any
mention of explicit mental states could not interfere with
participants’ level of awareness during that task. As
mentioned in the Participants section, 10 participants did
not pass this assessment, as their responses reflected
awareness of our belief manipulation and/or engagement
in explicit mental state processing, and were excluded
from further data analyses.
Explicit general-belief localizer task
The final part of the fMRI scanning session consisted of
an explicit general-belief localizer task adapted from
Dodell-Feder et al. [2011]. In this task, participants were pre-
sented with short vignettes, followed by a statement that
they identified as “true” or “false” by pressing one of two
buttons on the button box. The vignettes either described a
scenario that required participants to think about the
updated mental state of the character(s) (i.e., a false-belief
trial) or the physical or logical aspects of an updated sce-
nario (i.e., a false-photograph trial). For example, a false-
belief vignette could be “expecting the game to be post-
poned because of the rain, the Garcia family took the sub-
way home. The score was tied, 3–3. During their commute
the rain stopped and the game soon ended with a score of
5–3.” The associated statement was, “The Garcia family
arrives home believing the score is 5–3.” On the other hand,
an example false-photograph vignette would be “accounts
of the country’s bustling economic success were recorded in
both fiction and non-fiction books from the early 1900s.
Soon after, a horrible plague hit the country and the country
was sent into an economic depression.” The associated
statement was, “Early 1900s novels portray the country as
experiencing economic wealth.” The correct response to
these two statements would be “false” and “true,” respec-
tively. Each trial lasted for 32 s, and consisted of the presen-
tation of the vignette (14 s), followed by the response
statement (4 s), and an intertrial interval (14 s). There were a
total of 20 false-belief trials and 20 false-photograph trials
split over 2 runs.
Auxiliary measures
At the end of the scanning session, participants com-
pleted three self-report questionnaires to identify those
who present with social processing difficulties, which
could influence their performance on either ToM task.
These measures included the Autism-Spectrum Quotient
(AQ) [Baron-Cohen et al., 2001] to assess for traits associ-
ated with the autistic spectrum, the Empathising Quotient
(EQ) [Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004] to assess abili-
ties associated with understanding, predicting, and experi-
encing another person’s emotions, and the Systemizing
Quotient (SQ) [Baron-Cohen et al., 2003] to assess abilities
associated with understanding, analysing and predicting
external elements and systems. All participants fell within
the normal range on the AQ (M5 19.2, SD5 6.1, where
the clinical cut-off is 32 out of 50), EQ (M5 47.6, SD5 10.8
out of 80) and SQ (M5 69.7, SD5 21.9 out of 80), and
thus, we will not discuss these measures any further.
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fMRI Data Acquisition
We acquired anatomical and functional images using a
3 T Siemens Trio MRI scanner (Erlangen, Germany) with a
32-channel head coil. Participants wore MRI-compatible
headphones, lay supine in the scanner and viewed the
visual display via a rear-projection mirror mounted on the
head coil. We monitored participants’ eye movements dur-
ing the implicit ToM task using an Eyelink 1000 (500 Hz)
eye-tracker mounted at the bore of the scanner. All func-
tional T2*-weighted images were aligned to the anteri-
or–posterior commissure and measured using the following
GRE EPI sequence parameters: TR5 2 s, TE5 25 ms,
FA5 908, FOV5 192 3 192, matrix5 64 3 64, in-plane
resolution5 3 mm). Each functional volume consisted of 33
slices with a 3 mm thickness (10% inter-slice gap), and its
acquisition was synchronized with the stimulus presenta-
tion. A total of 189 volumes and 164 volumes were mea-
sured for each run of the implicit ToM and explicit general-
belief localizer tasks, respectively, where the first 3 volumes
of each run were discarded from data analyses to allow for
T1 equilibrium. A high-resolution T1-weighted image was
acquired in the middle of the scanning session using the fol-
lowing MPRAGE sequence parameters: TR5 1.9 s, TE5 2.3
ms, FA5 98, FOV5 192 3 230 3 256, resolution5 1 mm3.
fMRI Data Analysis
We preprocessed and analyzed the fMRI data using
BrainVoyager QX 2.6 (Brain Innovation) and custom MAT-
LAB code. The data preprocessing steps included 3D
motion correction (where each functional run image was
aligned to the first run), slice-scan-time correction, high-
pass temporal filtering (3 cycles/run), and Talairach space
transformation [Talairach and Tourmoux, 1988]. We ana-
lyzed data from the implicit ToM task using an ROI
approach, and these ROIs were localized using data from
the explicit general-belief localizer task. To isolate these
ROIs, we conducted a whole-brain random-effects general
linear model (GLM) with regressors defined for the false-
belief and false-photograph conditions. The events in each
regressor were defined as the nine volumes corresponding
to the presentation of the vignette and question and con-
volved with a double-gamma hemodynamic response
function. This analysis approach followed the recommen-
dations of Dodell-Feder et al. [2011].
We contrasted activity between false-belief and false-
photograph conditions in the localiser group GLM to iso-
late the following brain regions at a statistical threshold of
q(FDR)< 0.05 (Fig. 2A; peak Talairach XYZ coordinates in
parentheses): middle frontal gyrus (MFG; left, 229, 16, 37;
right, 23, 22, 41), precuneus (21, 256, 34), TPJ (left, 246,
260, 21; right, 49, 254, 21), STS (left, 256, 222, 27; right,
53, 223, 24), temporal pole (left, 255, 5, 218; right, 52, 6,
216), dmPFC (22, 53, 18), and vmPFC (0, 49 211). These
ROIs consist of brain regions that typically activate during
explicit ToM tasks [e.g., Aichhorn et al., 2009; Dodell-
Feder et al., 2011; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Van Over-
walle, 2009], and were defined based on previously pub-
lished Talairach coordinates from Schneider et al. [2014a]
and Schurz et al. [2014]. Using these ROIs, we extracted
individual-subject BOLD time courses from the belief test
phase of the implicit ToM task (where stimuli were physi-
cally identical across both belief conditions) for false-belief
and no-belief trials. Percentage signal change was calcu-
lated relative to one volume prior to the onset of the belief
test movie. We defined peak amplitude as the greatest per-
centage signal change during the time window corre-




To analyze eye movements from the implicit ToM task,
we measured the location and duration of fixations corre-
sponding to five key areas of interest: The protagonist’s
face, left arm, right arm, and the left and right boxes
[Schneider et al., 2012a]. Eye movements were collapsed
across the arm and box regions to form the region corre-
sponding to the ball location (the box where the ball was
actually located) and the no-ball location (the empty box).
Data were analyzed over the time period corresponding to
the 6 s still frame of the belief test phase, and we mea-
sured the percentage of first fixations and fixation dura-
tions at each of the three visual regions (face, ball, and no
ball locations). We have previously found that false-belief
scenarios enhanced looking behavior at the no-ball loca-
tion, compared to true-belief scenarios [e.g., Schneider
et al., 2012a,b]. To reiterate, we expected participants to
look at the no-ball location more under false- versus no-
belief conditions.
Counter to our hypothesis, a 2 (Belief Condition: false-
belief, no-belief) 3 3 (Visual Region: face, ball or no-ball
location) repeated-measures ANOVA of the percentage of
first fixations revealed a main effect of Visual Region, F(1,
23)5 28.04, MSE5 2313, P< 0.001, h2p5 0.57, but no main
effect of Belief Condition or interaction, Fs< 1 (Table I).
Follow-up t tests revealed that participants were more
likely to fixate first on the ball location, relative to both the
face and no-ball regions, ts> 3.54, Ps< 0.002, which were
also significantly different from one another, t(21)5 3.65,
P5 0.001. A similar pattern of results was observed for the
analysis of percentage of fixation durations: Main effect of
Visual Region F(1, 24)5 69.0, MSE5 962, P< 0.001,
h2p5 0.77, but no other significant effects or interactions,
Fs< 1. This main effect was driven by participants fixating
longer on the face region, relative to both the ball and no-
ball locations, ts> 8.48, Ps< 0.001, which did not differ
from each other, t(21)5 1.41, P5 0.175. The relative
amount of time participants spent looking at the no-ball
location was comparable to our previous studies using this
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paradigm [e.g., Schneider et al., 2012a,b], suggesting that
the introduction of the no-belief condition did not disrupt
participants’ typical looking behavior during this task. Sur-
prisingly, using a standard paradigm for eliciting implicit
belief processing, we failed to find a behavioral difference
in eye movement behavior between false- and no-belief
conditions. Possible reasons for this null result are laid-out
in Discussion.
fMRI Results
We compared peak BOLD activity from the belief test
phase of the implicit ToM task between false-belief and
no-belief conditions across each explicit ToM ROI. Evi-
dence for a region being involved in mental state process-
ing would be indexed by greater peak amplitude for false-
belief scenarios (where the protagonist’s belief about the
location of a ball was incongruent with the actual ball’s
location), relative to no-belief scenarios (where the protag-
onist had no pre-existing beliefs about the ball or puppet).
A 2 (Belief Condition: false-belief, no-belief) 3 11 (ROI:
left MFG, right MFG, precuneus, left TPJ, right TPJ, left
STS, right STS, left temporal pole, right temporal pole,
dmPFC, vmPFC) repeated-measures ANOVA of BOLD
peak amplitude revealed a main effect of ROI, F(5,
115)5 11.94, MSE5 0, P< 0.001, h2p5 0.36, and a signifi-
cant Belief Condition by ROI interaction, F(4, 84)5 3.28,
MSE5 0, P5 0.015, h2p5 0.14. The main effect of Belief
Condition did not reach significance, F(1, 21)5 1.94,
MSE5 0, P5 0.178, h2p5 0.09. Follow-up t tests revealed
significantly greater activity for false-belief trials, com-
pared with no-belief trials, in left MFG, precuneus, right
TPJ, and right STS, ts> 2.22, Ps< 0.038 (Fig. 2). These dif-
ferences were consistently observed across all subjects in
our sample (Supporting Information, Fig. 1 for distribu-
tional information). All other ROIs showed no significant
Figure 2.
Imaging results from regions of interest (ROI) analysis. (A)
Explicit theory of mind (ToM) regions localized from the explicit
general-belief localizer task. The anatomical image shows the
random-effects general linear model for all subjects at a statisti-
cal threshold of q(FDR)5 0.05. ROIs were isolated by contrast-
ing activity between false-belief and false-photograph conditions
(Dodell-Feder et al., 2011), and were defined by Talairach coor-
dinates taken from relevant prior studies (Schneider et al., 2014;
Schurz et al., 2014). The explicit ToM network included the
(1–2) left and right middle frontal gyrus (MFG), (3) precuneus,
(4–5) left and right temporoparietal junction (TPJ), (6) dorsome-
dial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), (7–8) left and right superior
temporal sulcus (STS), (9–10) left and right temporal pole
(TempP), and (11) ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). (B)
Mean peak signal amplitude as a function of Belief Condition
(false-belief, no-belief) and ROI. Error bars denote standard
error of the mean. *P< 0.05, follow-up t tests from significant
Belief Condition 3 ROI ANOVA.
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difference, ts< 1.78, Ps> 0.090. Extending on the small
group of brain regions identified in initial investigations
into spontaneous, belief-specific implicit ToM abilities
[Bardi et al., 2017; Hyde et al., 2015; Kovacs et al., 2014;
Schneider et al., 2014a], these results demonstrated sub-
stantial overlap between the implicit and explicit ToM
neural systems and point toward a general system in the
brain for belief processing.
DISCUSSION
This study had two key objectives. First, to explore
whether there is a general belief processing system in the
brain that is recruited by the implicit and explicit ToM sys-
tems. Second, to resolve the current conflict in the literature
surrounding the role of the TPJ in implicit ToM processes.
Using tightly controlled scenarios that encouraged process-
ing of a protagonist’s false-belief about a ball’s location,
without participants’ awareness, we found evidence of
implicit belief processing in a large number of brain regions
isolated via a classic explicit ToM paradigm. These brain
regions were more responsive under false-belief scenarios,
relative to no-belief scenarios, and included the right TPJ,
right STS, precuneus, and left MFG. These differences were
observed despite no physical differences between the stim-
uli used in each belief condition; the only factor that distin-
guished the two scenarios was the presence or absence of a
false-belief state in the initial belief set-up phase. These find-
ings expand upon the previous fMRI investigations con-
ducted into the implicit ToM system [Hyde et al., 2015;
Schneider et al., 2014a], and demonstrate a common subset
of brain regions that support both forms of mental state
processing. In addition, the present results converge with
previous work that has found common overlap between the
neural bases and temporal dynamics of implicit and explicit
processing of goals, intentions, trait attributions, and social
inferences [van Overwalle and Vandekerckhove, 2013].
However, there are still some regions that appear to be spe-
cifically recruited for explicit ToM processes (or at least
those mentalizing processes that are only tapped in verbal
scenarios as opposed to visual animations as used in our
iToM conditions), as not all explicit ToM brain regions were
modulated by the presence of implicit false beliefs. This
finding further supports the proposed theoretical and devel-
opmental distinction between explicit and implicit systems
that underlie domain-general (stimulus modality invariant)
ToM operations [Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Clements and
Perner, 1994].
Despite the clear distinction between false- and no-belief
conditions in our imaging results, we failed to find any
behavioral difference between our belief conditions. Specif-
ically, participants spent the same amount of time looking
at each of the box locations, regardless of whether the pro-
tagonist had a false-belief about the ball’s location, or no
belief at all. Critically, this was not due to a systematic
change in amount of time participants spent looking at the
no-ball location under the no-belief condition, as partici-
pants spent a similar amount of time looking at this loca-
tion to what we typically see in this paradigm [e.g.,
Schneider et al., 2012a,b]. It should be noted that the
majority of studies into implicit ToM have compared
behavioral measures between true- and false-belief condi-
tions [Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Schneider et al., 2012a;
Senju et al., 2011; Surian et al., 2007], or have had no
behavioral measure at all [Hyde et al., 2015]. Our findings,
therefore, reflect the first behavioral measure of false-belief
processing relative to a no-belief baseline.
One possible explanation for the dissociation of our
behavioral and imaging results could be sensitivity of each
measure (i.e., fMRI might be better able to detect changes
driven by an actor’s belief state than eye movements).
Alternatively, these findings could suggest that true-belief
scenarios, rather than false-belief scenarios, were the key
condition that drove the previously observed change in
looking behavior: Participants spent less time, relative to
false-belief/baseline conditions, looking at locations that
were not socially relevant when the social partner’s belief
matched the actual state of affairs. Indeed, individuals are
more likely to return their gaze away from a peripheral
object back to a protagonist in joint attention scenarios
when the protagonist consistently reciprocates the partici-
pants’ social bids, relative to when they consistently reject
them [Bayliss et al., 2012]. These findings suggest that
peripheral objects might be inherently curious and atten-
tion grabbing, but they can lose their significance if
another person’s behavior, or belief, deems them to be less
socially relevant.
Evidence for the role of the TPJ in the implicit ToM sys-
tem is mixed. Indeed, some studies have found that the
right TPJ was more active when a protagonist’s belief was
TABLE I. Behavioral results from implicit ToM task
First fixation (%) Fixation duration (%)
Face Ball No ball Face Ball No ball
False belief 26.7 (24.9) 63.3 (27.6) 9.0 (7.0) 67.0 (20.4) 17.9 (10.6) 15.1 (12.5)
No belief 27.4 (24.0) 64.9 (25.0) 7.4 (7.8) 67.3 (18.6) 17.5 (11.1) 15.2 (10.0)
Mean percentage of first fixations and fixation durations as a function of Belief Condition (false-belief and no-belief) and Visual Region
(face, ball, and no-ball locations). Standard deviations are listed in the parentheses.
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a false, relative to a true, reflection of reality [Bardi et al.,
2017; Hyde et al., 2015; Kovacs et al., 2014), whereas others
have failed to find any difference despite using multiple
analytic approaches [Schneider et al., 2014a]. The results
from this study suggest that the right TPJ is indeed part of
the implicit ToM system, as it can detect the presence ver-
sus absence of a false belief state. Similar conflicting find-
ings have been noted in the explicit ToM literature,
whereby the right TPJ consistently shows greater activity
for false-belief scenarios versus false-photographs or no-
belief control trials [Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Saxe and
Kanwisher, 2003], but does not reliably distinguish
between true- and false-belief conditions [Aichhorn et al.,
2009; D€ohnel et al., 2012; Sommer et al., 2007]. Our TPJ
ROI corresponds to the more dorsal/posterior part of the
TPJ, which typically activates more strongly during ToM
tasks that contrast false-beliefs and false-photographs (pre-
cisely the task we used for our explicit ToM localizer
[Dodell-Feder et al., 2011]), contrary to the more ventral/
anterior part of the TPJ, which was more responsive dur-
ing ToM tasks that involve social animations, mind-in-the-
eyes judgements or rational reasoning [Schurz et al., 2014].
A recent meta-analysis supported this functional distinc-
tion between the TPJ regions in showing that the more
anterior region of the TPJ is involved in both attentional
and ToM processes, whereas the more posterior region is
specific to the social domain [Krall et al., 2015]. The TPJ
ROI used by Kovacs et al. [2014] and Hyde et al. [2015]
was slightly more anterior (e.g., XYZ5 47, 249, 18, Talair-
ach coordinates) to the ROI used in our current and previ-
ous work [Schneider et al., 2014a]. Differences in the
functional localization of the TPJ might account for these
discrepant TPJ results, and future research could usefully
explore whether the anterior and posterior sections of the
TPJ are differentially involved in implicit belief processing.
Differences in participants’ task are another factor that
could account for these discrepant TPJ results. In our
work, participants’ primary task is to detect high and low
tones, with the aim of distracting them from (or at least
reducing the chances of) engaging in explicit mentalizing
while watching the videos. Conversely, Kovacs et al.
[2014], Bardi et al. [2017] and Hyde et al. [2015] instructed
participants to detect whether the ball (the target content
of the protagonist’s true-/false-belief) was present or
absent, or to passively view the movies, respectively.
Thus, there was no way to guarantee that the TPJ activity
observed in these studies does not reflect some level of
explicit belief processing. Hyde et al. [2015] did, however,
survey participants using a similar funneled debriefing
questionnaire to this study, and excluded those partici-
pants that showed any awareness of the belief manipula-
tion, suggesting that participants in this study at least did
not engage in explicit belief processing.
A further distinguishing factor between our task and that
used by Hyde et al. [2015] was the inclusion of a final
“choice” phase, where on false-belief trials, some participants
saw the protagonist open the empty box (an expected behav-
ior given their belief), whereas other participants saw them
open the box with the ball (an unexpected behavior given
their belief). Hyde et al. found no differences in right TPJ
activity between these two false-belief groups, which was not
surprising given the small sample size of each group (n5 10
and 5, respectively). This manipulation of the protagonist’s
behavior could have changed the nature of the false-belief tri-
als, however, whereby the participant now had to monitor
not only their belief state and that of the protagonist but also
the expected behavior of the protagonist. Indeed previous
work has shown the right TPJ is sensitive to the pre-existing
expectations we have about a protagonist’s behavior and its
impact on mental state evaluations [Saxe and Wexler, 2005].
The right TPJ response to false-belief trials in Hyde et al.
[2015] could therefore have been enhanced by additional
expectancy processes, which were not present in our past or
current designs.
The current findings corroborate our previous work
implicating the role of the STS and precuneus in implicit
ToM processing, in which we observed greater activity in
these brain areas for false-beliefs, relative to true-beliefs
[Schneider et al., 2014a]. Here we show that left STS and
precuneus can also distinguish false-belief scenarios from
situations that involve no implicit beliefs (albeit this effect
was only marginal in the left STS, t(21)5 1.78, P5 0.090),
suggesting that implicit false beliefs elicit a greater mental-
izing load than both baseline/congruent belief processing
scenarios. These findings fit with the idea the STS is
involved in processing mental states from another person’s
perspective, while the precuneus is involved in processing
self-referential mental states [Abu-Akel and Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011]. Support for the role of the precuneus in self-
representation comes from Lou et al. [2004] who observed
greater activity in the precuneus in response to self-related
versus other-related character traits. On the other hand, the
STS was more active for judgements about others, compared
with judgements about oneself, implying that this brain
region is involved in representing others. Together these
findings suggest that the precuneus and STS might play a
role in processing mental states that have been attributed to
the self versus others; processes that are likely to be core
components of mentalizing [Apperly and Butterfill, 2009;
Schurz et al., 2015], in both its implicit and explicit forms.
The precuneus and STS/posterior TPJ have also been
more generally associated with the interplay between the
dorsal and ventral attentional systems in the brain [Cor-
betta and Shulman, 2002]. The dorsal attentional system is
responsible for directing attention toward stimuli that are
task-relevant, whereas the ventral attentional system moni-
tors and filters available information to reduce it down to
what is most important [Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory,
2011]. The middle frontal gyrus is a candidate region that
has also been implicated in interactions between the dorsal
and ventral attentional systems [Fox et al., 2006], and
indeed, we also found it to be responsive during the
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current implicit ToM task. This brain region has been asso-
ciated with specific explicit ToM tasks (e.g., false-belief vs
photograph stories [Gobbini et al., 2007]) and, similar to
the precuneus, is more active when people make self-
evaluations relative to judgements about others [Schulte-
Ruther et al., 2007]. Given the apparent overlap between
the brain regions involved in attention and mentalizing
processes (particularly in the TPJ; e.g., see Mitchell [2008]),
it has been suggested that ToM tasks might recruit atten-
tional processes that are necessary when shifting between
focusing on the internal world (i.e., the self or our own
perspective) and the external world (i.e., the perspectives
and mental states of others). As this ability to shift
between different perspectives is critical for inferring
another person’s mental state, whether it be with or with-
out awareness, it seems reasonable to assume that interac-
tions between the dorsal and ventral attentional systems
could play a role in implicit ToM processes [Schneider
et al., 2014a] or underpin a more general belief processing
system in the brain.
Collectively, we have provided novel evidence for a
general belief processing system that is responsive to both
implicit and explicit ToM processes, and systems that do
not completely overlap from ToM processing. Extending
upon our earlier work [Schneider et al., 2014a], we find a
more substantial degree of overlap between the implicit
and explicit ToM systems, including the right TPJ, right
STS, precuneus, and left middle frontal gyrus. These find-
ings provide neurophysiological support for the prominent
theoretical distinction between systems involved in
implicit and explicit, domain-general (stimulus modality
invariant) ToM [Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Clements
and Perner, 1994]. Moreover, our findings illustrate the
importance of using comparisons of belief presence (i.e.,
false-belief vs no-belief conditions) as well as comparisons
of belief content (i.e., false-belief vs true-belief conditions)
when trying to discern the full extent of the implicit, and
general-belief, ToM networks. These different belief sce-
narios (and the degree to which belief states are truly
implicit or not) could modulate the level of attentional
engagement and task-relevance of the protagonist’s mental
state, which might in turn affect whether a given brain
region is active during the implicit ToM task. Our results
expand our understanding of the implicit ToM system in
the human brain, and the extent to which it overlaps with,
and differs from, its explicit counterpart.
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